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ABSTRACT 
 
We synthesize available literature, data, and analysis on the degree to which growth in variable 
renewable energy (VRE) has impacted or might in the future impact bulk power system assets, 
pricing, and costs in the United States. Most studies of future scenarios indicate that VRE 
reduces wholesale energy prices and capacity factors of thermal generators. Traditional baseload 
generators are more exposed to these changing market conditions than low-capital cost and more 
flexible intermediate and peak-load generators. From analysis of historical data we find that VRE 
is already influencing the bulk power market through changes in temporal and geographic 
patterns areas with higher levels of VRE. The most significant observed impacts have 
concentrated in areas with significant VRE and/or nuclear generation along with limited 
transmission, with negative pricing also often occurring during periods with lower system-wide 
load. So far, however, VRE, has had a relatively modest impact on historical average annual 
wholesale prices across entire market regions, at least in comparison to other drivers. The 
reduction of natural gas prices is the primary contributor to the decline in wholesale prices since 
2008. Similarly, VRE impacts on thermal plant retirements have been limited and there is little 
relationship between the location of recent retirements and VRE penetration levels. Although 
impacts on wholesale prices have been modest so far, impacts of VRE on the electricity market 
will be more significant under higher VRE penetrations.  
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ABBREVIATIONS  
 
AS Ancillary services 
CAISO California Independent System Operator 
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine 
CREZ Competitive Renewable Energy Zones 
CT Combustion turbine 
DOE Department of Energy 
EGEAS Electric Generation Expansion Analysis System 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
EI Eastern interconnection 
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
EWITS Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study 
ISO Independent system operator 
ISO-NE ISO New England 
LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
LMP Locational marginal price 
MISO Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
NYISO New York Independent System Operator 
PG&E Pacific Gas & Electric  
PJM PJM Interconnection 
PTC Production tax credit 
PV Photovoltaics 
REC Renewable energy credit 
RPS Renewables portfolio standard 
RT Real-time 
RTO Regional transmission organization 
SERC SERC Reliability Corporation 
SPP Southwest Power Pool 
VRE  Variable renewable energy 
WECC Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
WWSIS Western Wind and Solar Integration Study 
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1. Introduction 
 
Wholesale power prices and the composition and operation of the bulk power system in the 
United States have witnessed changes in recent years, and concern has grown in some quarters 
about the effects of variable renewable energy (VRE) on these trends. The U.S. Department of 
Energy’s (DOE) recent “Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability” 
addressed this concern, but within a much broader context [1]. The study focused on thermal-
plant retirements and reliability, and placed a spotlight not only on growth in VRE but also on 
the effects of other contemporaneous trends such as declining natural gas prices, limited load 
growth, and regulatory pressures.  
 
As input into the DOE Staff Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Argonne 
National Laboratory prepared a study [2] that focused on the degree to which growth in VRE has 
impacted wholesale power prices and bulk power system assets to date and how this may change 
in the future. Here we present our synthesis of available literature, data and analysis on the 
degree to which growth in VRE has influenced or might in the future impact wholesale markets 
and generating assets in the U.S. Specifically, we highlight the possible impacts of VRE on 
wholesale power market pricing, operation of other power plants, and incentives for generation 
asset retirement and investment.  Where possible, we frame these past or prospective impacts of 
VRE within the context of other possible drivers for some of the same trends.  In Section 3, our 
synthesis examines results from U.S. studies that rely on detailed power system models, then in 
Section 4 we focus on observations of historical market data to show the impact of VRE to date.     
 
We highlight up front several important notes on the scope and limitations of this work. First, 
this paper is primarily a synthesis of the available literature and data. While the literature is 
broad and deep it is far from complete. Analyzing the impacts of VRE on bulk power markets is 
a complex area of research and there is much more work to be pursued in this area. Second, this 
paper is largely focused on restructured, wholesale electricity markets. While many of the issues 
addressed are also relevant to regions with vertically-integrated electric utilities this is not always 
the case. Third, this paper does not comprehensively address issues related to short-time-scale 
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variations in VRE and technical characteristics of VRE as they affect power system reliability 
and VRE integration. Fourth, this paper does not address market design and compensation 
mechanism design given the changing mix of generation resources, which is a focus of much 
recent research and debate [1,3–10]. Finally, while we seek to draw some generalizable 
conclusions from the available market data and literature, all of the issues addressed are highly 
context dependent — affected by the underlying generation mix of the system, the amount of 
wind and solar penetration, and the design and structure of the bulk power system in each region. 
Therefore, we do not analyze impacts to specific power plants, instead focusing on identifying 
national and regional system-level trends. Regional differences are extensive in the electricity 
sector, and thus conclusions may differ from one region to the next. 
 
 
2. Unique Attributes of VRE that Can Impact the Bulk Power Market 
 
All generation types are unique in some respect, imposing varying forms of physical and 
operational limitations, and wholesale markets and industry investments and operations have 
evolved over time to manage new challenges. Wind and solar photovoltaics (PV), meanwhile, 
have four somewhat-unique characteristics that can influence wholesale market prices and 
generation assets [11–13].   
• Weather-driven variability in electricity production, which can impact energy and capacity 
markets as well as ramping and ancillary service needs  
• Uncertainty in forecasts of future output, which can impact ancillary service needs and costs 
• Resource-driven location dependencies that, in some cases, can impact the need for or benefit 
of new transmission investment 
• Low, or even negative marginal costs, which tend to place VRE before resources in the 
dispatch merit order 
 
To further clarify the last point, it is important to understand that wind energy in the U.S. 
receives a 10-year federal production tax credit (PTC), an incentive that is currently being 
phased-out over a multi-year period (at times, wind plants have also had the opportunity to take 
investment-based support in lieu of the PTC). Additionally, both solar and wind benefit from 
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renewables portfolio standards (RPS) in many states. Both the PTC and the RPS create 
incentives for VRE plant owners and purchasers to bid that generation into wholesale markets at 
negative prices. The reason is simple: curtailment of generation will result in not only lost 
energy-based revenue but also potentially lost incentive value [4]. Nor are these policy incentives 
the only reason that a VRE project may bid at negative price: market demand for ‘green energy’ 
by residential, corporate, and governmental entities yields positive prices for renewable energy 
certificates (RECs), even in the absence of RPS programs.  
Given those characteristics of VRE, increasing the share of VRE tends to reduce average 
wholesale energy prices (LMPs), at least in the short term. All else being equal, lower wholesale 
electricity prices will generally result in reduced revenues for generation units. These reduced 
revenues may place particular strain on the operating profits of inflexible units that are not able 
to respond to the price signals by dispatching down when wholesale prices drop below short-run 
operating costs. The capacity factors and cycling behavior of some units will be affected as well, 
reducing electricity generation and possibly increasing operating costs for some units. High VRE 
penetrations may also increase ancillary service requirements, however, and therefore may 
increase the market clearing prices for operating reserves, creating additional revenue 
opportunities for units that are able to provide these services. Increased wholesale price volatility 
will similarly provide signals to the market of increased value from providing flexibility to the 
grid.  
 
3. Modeled Impacts of VRE on the Bulk Power System 
 
We reviewed several studies focused on U.S.1 that present concrete quantitative projections for 
how various metrics may change as more VRE is introduced into power systems, listed in Table 4. However, care must be exercised when making direct comparisons between the results of 
individual studies, as the studies were conducted at different times, cover different regional 
electricity systems, apply different scheduling and dispatch models, and use varying parameter 
assumptions (e.g., fuel prices, model year, load growth, unit expansion and retirement, VRE 
penetration, etc.). Additionally, these studies take a number of different approaches to modeling                                                         
1 There are a number of international studies that cover similar topics [14–18]. Many of the qualitative findings are similar to 
those reported in the U.S. literature. 
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system evolution in response to increasing VRE penetrations. Detailed modeling of system 
dispatch and market clearing prices also vary across the studies. 
 
 [     Table 4 about here         ] 
 
3.1. Overview of Studies  
The studies cover a wide variety of different regions in the U.S. The Renewable Energy Futures 
Study [19] covers the entire continental U.S. while the Western Wind and Solar Integration 
Study (WWSIS) (Phase 2) [20] covers the Western Interconnection and the Eastern Wind 
Integration and Transmission Study [21] and Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study 
[22] cover the Eastern Interconnection.  Many of the other studies focus on particular organized 
wholesale markets, including studies focused on the California Independent System Operator 
(CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), Southwest Power Pool (SPP),  
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO),  PJM Interconnection (PJM), New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO), and New England Independent System Operator (ISO-
NE.  One study focuses on Colorado [23], a state outside of an organized wholesale market.  
Locations of the organized wholesale markets are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Note: All regions from SPP to the east are in the Eastern Interconnection, all regions west of SPP are in the 
Western Interconnection, and ERCOT is part of the Texas Interconnection. 
Source: FERC https://www.ferc.gov/images/maps/rto_map.gif 
Figure 1. Location of ISO/RTO regions in North America. 
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The studies also vary in terms of the mix of variable renewables considered in the scenarios.  
Many focus exclusively on wind energy, including some scenarios with offshore wind. Others 
include a mix of wind and solar, particularly in more recent studies or studies that cover regions 
with high solar resource quality like the southwestern U.S.  None of the studies focus exclusively 
on solar.  
 
The studies focus on a variety of questions related to integrating VRE into power system 
operations and markets. Several studies focused on the technical and physical barriers to 
operating the grid with high levels of VRE [19,21,22,24]. The WWSIS [24] identified several 
changes to integrate 30% wind and 5% solar including increased balancing area cooperation, 
implementation of sub-hourly scheduling, and expansion of transmission infrastructure as 
appropriate. Studies focused on particular ISOs often considered both operational impacts and 
market impacts of high shares of VRE [25–27].  Other studies focused on more specific 
questions, such as impacts of VRE on revenue sufficiency [28–30], the market value of 
renewables at high penetration levels [31,32], the costs of thermal plant cycling [20], impacts to 
ancillary service prices [23,27], and the impact of various solar plant configurations [33]. 
 
All of the studies model the dispatch of generation, but they differ in how they treat decisions to 
invest in or retire generation capacity. The reviewed studies are broadly segmented into two 
general categories based on the modeling approach:  
• Studies that fix the capacity of the existing generation fleet irrespective of the introduction of 
new VRE capacity into the system  
• Studies that use capacity expansion models or assumptions to define investment and 
retirement of thermal units for each scenario of VRE capacity  
Studies with fixed thermal expansion just use tools that simulate the dispatch of power systems.  
Studies that vary investment or retirement decisions for each scenario of VRE capacity often also 
use capacity expansion models in addition to more detailed grid dispatch tools.  The Eastern 
Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) [21], for example, examined used the 
Electric Generation Expansion Analysis System (EGEAS) capacity expansion model from the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to conduct a regional capacity expansion analysis for 
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each wind scenario. Each scenario was then examined in more detail using the PROMOD 
production cost model to identify technical and physical barriers to operating the grid with high 
levels of wind generation.   
 
In contrast to this two-step approach of building a scenario with a capacity expansion model then 
evaluating the scenario with a production cost model, some studies use tools that tightly link the 
capacity expansion and dispatch. Levin and Botterud [29], for example, developed a new 
modeling framework to determine the least-cost thermal unit expansion, hourly commitment and 
dispatch of energy and ancillary services in a power system. They applied the model to a case 
study of a simplified ‘ERCOT-like’ system that bundles thermal generators into four unit types: 
nuclear, coal, natural gas combined-cycle, and natural gas combustion turbines. They examined 
the impacts to generation expansion, energy prices, ancillary services prices, and thermal unit 
revenue sufficiency that would result under 10% (baseline), 20%, 30%, and 40% wind 
generation. Bistline [32]  and Mills and Wiser [31] similarly developed models that 
simultaneously solve investment and dispatch for cases with high shares of variable renewables.   
 
All of the studies described above establish fixed VRE targets and analyze how the system may 
respond to integrate those particular levels of renewable penetration. In contrast to those studies, 
Shavel et al. [34] presented a model that optimizes investments in all new generation capacity 
(wind, solar, and thermal) in the ERCOT system in response to various parameter sensitivities, 
e.g. natural gas prices, renewable technology costs, and carbon emissions regulations. Therefore, 
the resultant VRE penetrations in each of six different scenarios are determined endogenously by 
the model itself, as with all other types of generation in order to minimize costs.  
 
Note that all of the studies, with the exception of the last one, impose VRE exogenously. 
Moreover, they assume a substantial amount of existing resources, which are not adapted to a 
high VRE resource mix. Since it may take decades for the resource portfolio to fully adapt, and 
also since retirement decisions are not considered in all the studies, the resulting generation mix 
will likely deviate from what would emerge from a greenfield long-run equilibrium analysis. The 
results should be interpreted accordingly.  
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3.2. Impacts to Wholesale Energy Prices 
 
Despite the different methodological approaches and the range of parameter assumptions 
applied, there appears to be broad consensus that higher levels of VRE will result in lower 
average wholesale electricity prices, or LMPs (Figure 2). This trend is further highlighted in Table 1.  which presents the change in average wholesale energy price that corresponds with a 
1% increase in VRE penetration. These values range from -$0.80 to -$0.10/MWh across the 
selected studies, with an average value of -$0.37/MWh. In interpreting these results, it is 
important to consider that different generation technologies have different exposure to the 
reductions in the average price. A flexible plant will be less exposed to periods of low (or even 
negative) wholesale energy prices since they can dispatch down when LMPs are lower than the 
generator’s short-run marginal operating costs. A non-hedged fully inflexible plant (whether 
inflexible physically, contractually, or otherwise), on the other hand, will be exposed to the full 
reduction in average prices because such a plant will not dispatch down even when wholesale 
energy prices fall below short-run operating costs. Electricity purchasers and customers, 
meanwhile, will benefit from these wholesale energy price reductions; note, however, that other 
system costs not embedded in LMPs may increase (e.g., the direct and transmission costs 
associated with VRE).  
 
It is also important to keep in mind that most of the studies do not reflect long-run equilibrium 
conditions, but rather systems where the generation portfolio has not fully adapted to the higher 
levels of VRE. Price formation in fully adapted systems in long-run equilibrium may therefore 
differ from the trends revealed in the majority of our sample of studies. In particular, studies that 
fix the capacity of the existing generation fleet irrespective of the introduction of new VRE 
capacity into the system tend to reflect short-run conditions and prices impacts.   
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Note: Studies denoted with an asterisk report a simple average price while the remainder report a load-weighted average price. 
Figure 2. Projected Wholesale Electricity Prices with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
Table 1. Relationship Between Average Wholesale Electricity Price and VRE Penetration 
Study Change in price ($/MWh) per % 
increase in VRE penetration 
Brancucci Martinez-Anido et al. (ISO-NE) -$0.15 
Deetjan et al. (ERCOT)* -$0.25 
EnerNex (EI) -$0.46 
Fagan et al. (MISO) -$0.28 
GE Energy (2014, PJM) -$0.50 
LCG (ERCOT) -$0.52 
Levin and Botterud (ERCOT) -$0.41 
Mills and Wiser (solar, CAISO)* -$0.13 
Mills and Wiser (wind, CAISO)* -$0.10 
NESCOE (ISO-NE)* -$0.80 
NYISO (NYISO) -$0.45 
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3.3. Impacts to Operating Reserve Prices 
 
While the impacts of high VRE penetrations on wholesale energy prices have been studied in 
some detail, the impacts on prices for operating reserves2 are generally not as well understood; 
this is the case for a number of reasons. Reserve markets are much smaller than energy markets 
in terms of total value. Reserve markets have also been introduced more recently than energy 
markets, are less uniform across different ISOs, and their market rules have been adjusted 
frequently over the past decade, making it more difficult to isolate the primary drivers of price 
impacts. Hence, modeling reserves markets is more challenging than energy markets. However, 
as VRE penetrations increase, ancillary service (AS) markets may serve as a mechanism for 
monetizing a portion of the value of flexibility in power systems, thereby providing an 
increasingly important revenue stream for flexible generating units.  
 
In the wholesale energy market, low marginal cost VREs influence prices (i.e., LMPs) directly 
from the supply-side, by providing generation at low (or negative) marginal cost, which most 
studies indicate lead to lower market clearing prices in the short term (Figure 2). In contrast to 
the energy market, however, VREs have not typically supplied operating reserves themselves, at 
least historically, and therefore do not necessarily directly affect the market from the supply-
side.3 Because some generators can provide both energy and operating reserves, energy market 
prices and operating reserve prices are indirectly related though opportunity costs [35].  
Influences of VRE on energy market prices can therefore indirectly affect the market prices for 
operating reserves on the supply-side, though the effect is ambiguous.  Additions of VRE can 
free up other generation to provide operating reserve instead of energy, lowering reserve prices.  
Or additions of VRE can lower energy prices and increase the opportunity cost of a generator 
that has to be online and producing energy in order to provide reserves, increasing reserve prices.   
                                                        2 We focus primarily on the operating reserves that are typically procured through market mechanisms in the United States, i.e., regulation and contingency reserves.  3 This has historically been the case due to a combination of technical limitations, market rules that prevent participation, economic opportunity costs that may limit voluntary participation, and VRE generation incentives that are foregone by units while they provide reserves. However, VREs may begin to provide more operating reserves as penetration levels increase. VRE has the technical capacity to provide downward spinning reserves under most system conditions, and also upward spinning reserves under certain system conditions (e.g., if the VRE generator is currently being curtailed).  
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Another impact of VREs on reserves prices is introduced through increased demand for these 
services. The impact of VREs on reserve prices is felt on the demand-side, as higher VRE 
penetrations will likely require greater AS quantities to balance the increasing overall variability 
and uncertainty in the system in order to maintain system reliability within given reliability 
standards, thereby also driving up AS prices. This is particularly the case with regulation 
reserves, which are typically procured hourly through day-ahead and/or real-time markets. 
Resources that participate in the regulation reserve market must be able to adjust their generation 
output level in response to automatic generation control signals that are sent roughly every four 
seconds, or less in the case of fast-frequency response signals that are being implemented in 
some markets. As VRE penetrations increase so too will short-term net load variability, and 
greater quantities of regulation reserves will be required to ensure that supply and demand are 
balanced in real-time; this increased demand for regulation reserves may tend to increase prices 
for the service.4 
 
For example, an analysis of 30% VRE penetration in PJM found that an additional annual 
average of 1,000 MW to 1,500 MW of regulation reserves would be required to maintain system 
reliability; on the other hand, no additional spinning or non-spinning reserves would be required 
[26]. Hummon et al. [23] calculated hourly regulation requirements based on the statistical 
variability of load, wind, and solar generation, while Mills and Wiser [31] assumed the 
regulation requirement to be 2% of hourly load plus 5% of the day-ahead wind or solar forecast. 
Both of these latter studies assumed that contingency reserve requirements are independent of 
VRE penetration; these requirements are instead impacted by the possibility of large generator or 
transmission outages. This assumption reveals a more-general truth: VRE is not alone in 
impacting reserve needs and markets, as inflexible baseload units also must be complemented by 
more flexible units that are able to follow load and provide operating and contingency reserves; 
in other words, the amount and nature of AS requirements may vary based on technology, but 
various reserves are required for all generation types [36,37]. 
                                                        4 Historical experience with managing growing shares of VRE demonstrates that market reforms and improvements to VRE forecasts can actually lead to reductions in reserves as VRE are added [35], though studies tend to focus on the effect of VRE on reserves keeping all else constant.         
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Reserve requirements are set administratively and therefore a primary challenge of modeling the 
AS markets is that prices are typically largely dependent on administratively determined 
parameters, such as hourly AS requirements, scarcity pricing rules, or in the case of ERCOT, the 
shape of the operating reserve demand curves. Therefore, while it is possible to model market 
outcomes under different assumed future scenarios, it is difficult to predict how market design 
will evolve in the long term to accommodate changes in the bulk power system. Moreover, the 
costs of providing reserves, which consist partly of opportunity costs from not providing services 
in other markets (e.g., energy in the energy market), is complex to estimate, adding to the reserve 
market modeling challenge. 
 
Due in part to the complexities described above, there are relatively few studies that reported 
reserve prices. The results of the relevant studies reviewed here are summarized in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Overall, the picture is not as clear as for energy prices. There is a general trend of 
increasing prices for regulation with higher VRE penetrations. The picture for spinning and non-
spinning reserves is somewhat less clear, with studies showing a combination of relatively stable 
or increasing reserve prices with the VRE level. Overall, it is difficult to draw any strong 
conclusions from this sample. 
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Figure 3. Projected Prices for Frequency Regulation Reserve with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
 
Figure 4. Projected Prices for Spinning and Non-Spinning Reserves with Increasing VRE 
Penetrations 
 
3.4. System Dispatch, Thermal-Plant Capacity Factors, and Cycling Costs 
 
The overall dispatch of the power system changes as VRE penetrations increase. Since VREs 
enter at the lowest marginal cost end of the merit-order dispatch curve, other technologies with 
higher marginal costs tend to be dispatched less. The capacity factors of thermal generators will 
therefore tend to decrease, as summarized in Figure 5 through Figure 7. Note that most studies 
assumed that nuclear units are inflexible and therefore their capacity factors either do not change 
significantly or are not explicitly analyzed.   
 
This effect will be particularly pronounced if VREs are added on top of existing generation 
resources, leading to a surplus of available capacity. In the longer run, the generation portfolio of 
the system is likely to settle around an equilibrium solution where the mix of generation shifts 
toward resources with lower fixed costs and VREs replace some of the existing generation 
resources, with the degree of displacement affected by the capacity credit of VRE as well as any 
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policy or regulatory decisions that speed or slow the transition. Still, since the capacity credit of 
VREs is lower than that of thermal units, especially at higher penetrations, the level of displaced 
capacity will not be as significant as the amount of added VRE. Hence, the capacity factors of 
the remaining dispatchable generation technologies are likely to decrease, on average, though the 
increased need for system flexibility may mitigate these declines for some specific plant types.  
 
Another potential consequence of increasing VRE levels is that dispatchable units may have to 
cycle more often. Some studies have examined how increased VRE penetrations will impact the 
cycling of thermal units and the corresponding costs that may be incurred, Figure 8; in 
restructured markets, altered wholesale energy price patterns and increases in AS needs and 
prices may—to a degree, at least—compensate dispatchable units for these increased cycling 
demands.  
 
There are several specific reasons for cycling-related cost increases. First, thermal unit 
ramping—i.e., adjusting generation output—typically causes some mechanical fatigue and may 
therefore increase long-term maintenance costs. Second, unit startups and shutdowns cause 
similar unit fatigue, and units also incur additional fuel costs for startups. GE Energy [26] found 
that natural gas combined-cycle units were the most significantly affected due to increased 
startup and shutdown requirements. The cycling costs of natural gas combustion turbines (CTs) 
were found to decrease at higher VRE levels due to overall decreases in generation from those 
plants.  These costs can be exacerbated by longer idle times that require warm or cold starts, as 
opposed to hot starts. Finally, units may be operated more frequently at lower output levels, 
which typically means that the operational efficiency is lower with a corresponding increase in 
fuel use and variable generation costs. These latter costs are generally not included in cycling 
cost calculations, and are instead embedded in the estimated impacts of VRE on system 
production costs; as such, we do not report these results here.  
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Figure 5. Capacity Factors for Coal Plants with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
 
Figure 6. Capacity Factors for Natural Gas Combined-Cycle Plants with Increasing VRE 
Penetrations 
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Figure 7. Capacity Factors for Natural Gas Combustion Turbine Plants with Increasing VRE 
Penetrations 
 
 
Figure 8. Cycling Costs for Thermal Plants with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
3.5. Revenues and Operating Profits for Generators 
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Revenue impacts originate from changes in wholesale prices (which influence the revenues 
received for each unit of generation) as well as changes in capacity factors (which influence the 
total quantity of generation a plant is able to sell into the market). Some studies focused on 
projected plant revenues and profits to anticipate plant types that may be at-risk for retirement, 
but did not explicitly consider such unit retirements in their modeling. As plant retirements 
decrease generation supply, these would likely have an upward influence on price and 
profitability for the remaining units in the long term. Not all studies considered this longer-term 
dynamic, and the results should be interpreted accordingly. 
 
In restructured markets, most generators receive the majority of their revenues through wholesale 
energy markets (see the various ISO/RTO market monitoring reports, e.g., [38–43]. Reserve 
markets have delivered additional revenue to some generators, but generally in small quantities. 
That said, reserve markets may play an increasingly important role for some units as VRE 
penetration increases and as the demand for these services grow. In some regions, capacity 
markets (or requirements that lead to bilateral capacity contracts) provide additional revenue to 
encourage resource adequacy, whereas in others (e.g., ERCOT) it is presumed that energy-
market prices will embed compensation for capacity during scarcity events. Regardless of the 
details, the important point for this review is that revenues from AS and capacity 
markets/contracts were not included in all studies, and so results should be interpreted with some 
caution. Note, finally, that all reviewed studies simulated the operation of a restructured 
wholesale market; power plants in regions that lack such markets or that have physical or 
financial contracts that hedge against wholesale market price variations may be—at least 
partially—immune from immediate revenue impacts as signaled by wholesale market prices and 
dynamics.  
 Figure 9 through Figure 12 summarize the reported impacts on operating revenues and profits 
for nuclear, coal, natural gas combined-cycle and CT plants. Studies differed in how they report 
revenues and profits: some strictly presented plant revenues, while others presented operating 
profits (i.e., revenues less operating costs but not considering capital costs). Table 2 indicates 
which cost and revenue streams were considered by each study. The studies that reported 
revenues (i.e., absent of operating costs) are also identified in the figure legend with a star, while 
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the remainder reported operating profits. As indicated in Table 2, none of the studies considered 
capital costs. Overall, it should be stressed, once again, that it is more appropriate to analyze 
these figures for the trends that are identified within each individual study, as opposed to making 
comparisons of the specific values identified across different studies. 
Table 2. Revenue and Cost Streams Included in the Revenue Analysis Presented by Each Study 
Study Energy Market 
Revenue 
AS Market 
Revenue 
Capacity 
Market 
Revenue 
Operating 
Costs 
Capital 
Costs 
Bistline (CAISO and 
ERCOT) 
X  n/a   
Frew et al. (ERCOT) X X n/a X  
GE Energy, 2010 
(ERCOT) 
X  n/a   
Levin and Botterud 
(ERCOT) 
X X n/a X  
Mills and Wiser 
(CAISO) 
X X n/a X  
NESCOE (ISO-NE) X  X X  
Shavel et al. 
(ERCOT) 
X X n/a X  
Note: Several of these studies embed capacity compensation in energy-market prices (e.g., through assumptions about scarcity 
pricing), even if capacity markets are not separately modeled. 
 
Overall, these studies show a downward sloping trend in revenue and operating profits for 
nuclear and coal plants as VRE penetrations increase. Natural gas fired generation tends to see a 
reduction in revenue with increasing VRE penetration but operating profits are generally less-
affected. This is partly because operating costs are largely variable in natureany reductions in 
total generation output also significantly reduce fuel costs. Those studies that assessed long-term 
equilibrium effects on profitability sometimes found that flexible gas plants fare reasonably well 
under higher VRE penetrations, at least in terms of operating profit: natural gas fired generation 
tends to be a competitive option with low fixed costs and low gas prices, and gas units are 
flexible and therefore tend to benefit from price spikes and to be less exposed to average price 
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reductions compared to nuclear and coal generation. Note that GE Energy [24] assumed a 
relatively high natural gas price ($9.50/MMbtu), and also included a $30/ton cost of carbon. This 
leads to higher reported energy prices and correspondingly higher revenues than reported by 
other studies. 
 
 
Note: Studies denoted with an asterisk report unit revenues while the remainder report operating profits. 
Figure 9. Operating Profits and Revenues for Nuclear Plants with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
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Note: Studies denoted with an asterisk report unit revenues while the remainder report operating profits. 
Figure 10. Operating Profits and Revenues for Coal Plants with Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
 
Note: Studies denoted with an asterisk report unit revenues while the remainder report operating profits. 
Figure 11. Operating Profits and Revenues for Natural Gas Combined-Cycle Plants with 
Increasing VRE Penetrations 
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Note: Studies denoted with an asterisk report unit revenues while the remainder report operating profits. 
Figure 12. Operating Profits and Revenues for Natural Gas Combustion Turbine Plants with 
Increasing VRE Penetrations 
 
3.6. Impact of Natural Gas Prices and VRE Incentives 
 
While it has been shown that increasing VRE penetrations may cause wholesale electricity prices 
to decline, the price of natural gas is another primary driver of electricity prices. 
 
Levin and Botterud [29] found a price reduction of 23% when the natural gas fuel price is 
reduced from its baseline value of $5.15/MMbtu to $3.00/MMbtu, comparable to the price 
reduction when wind penetration was increased from 10% to 40%. GE Energy [26] found that 
reducing natural gas prices from the baseline assumption of $8.02/MMbtu to $6.50/MMbtu lead 
to a price reduction of 7.4%, comparable to increasing VRE from 2% to 14%. The reference 
scenario presented by Shavel et al. [34] assumed lower natural gas prices (roughly $5.80/MMbtu 
vs. $7.50/MMbtu) and higher renewable costs than those assumed in the high renewable 
sensitivity scenarios. Reducing the natural gas price and increasing renewable costs has two 
primary impacts in this equilibrium analysis with endogenously determined VRE penetration. 
First, there is substantially less wind and solar generation—accounting for 7% of the system total 
compared to 33%. All else equal, previous evidence suggests that wholesale electricity prices 
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(i.e., LMPs) should increase as a result of the reduced VRE generation. Second, natural gas 
prices are also lower in this case and this has a downward impact on electricity prices. The 
combined effect is an overall decrease in average wholesale prices from approximately 
$58/MWh to $46/MWh. This suggest that in a long-run equilibrium setting, reducing natural gas 
prices will likely also reduce electricity prices, even if VRE generation is simultaneously reduced 
as well. 
 
Finally, Levin and Botterud [29] analyzed the system impacts of removing the federal PTC for 
wind generation, isolating the bidding impact of the PTC from its deployment effect (i.e., the 
wind penetration level was independent of the PTC assumption). In the base cases, wind 
generators were assumed to receive a $23/MWh tax credit. The study found that removing the 
PTC, but keeping wind penetration constant, does not influence electricity prices at 10% wind 
penetration, as wind never provides the marginal unit of generation under these conditions. At 
20% and higher wind penetration levels, on the other hand, the study did observe price impacts 
driven by the bidding impacts of wind power. The study found that removing the PTC increases 
the load-weighted average electricity price by 0.3%, 2.2% and 10.4% for 20%, 30% and 40% 
wind penetration respectively. This effect is still small compared to the impact of changes in 
natural gas prices.  
 
4. Observed Impacts of VRE on the Bulk Power System  
 
Here we turn our focus to historical empirical observations of the impact of VRE on wholesale 
market prices and generation assets by reviewing literature, analyzing wholesale market data, 
and utilizing simple power market models. In particular, we assess impacts to average annual 
wholesale prices, impacts to wholesale price variability with a focus on negative prices, and the 
relationship between VRE and recent power plant retirements. 
 
We focus on selected major electricity-trading hubs in ISOs identified by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA)5 (Figure 13), along with our own choice of hubs not listed by 
EIA (SPP South near Oklahoma City in SPP and Zone G near the Hudson Valley in NYISO).                                                         5 http://www.eia.gov/electricity /wholesale/ 
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We then place additional attention on specific ‘constrained’ pricing points. For the most part, we 
summarize hourly-averages of real-time (RT) prices, as reported in ABB’s Velocity Suite [44].  
 
 
Figure 13. Locations for a Portion of the Selected Electricity Pricing Points Investigated in this 
Analysis 
 
 
4.1. Impacts on Average Annual Historical Wholesale Electricity Prices 
 
Several studies have used historical observations or simple models to estimate the impact of 
VRE on wholesale prices for different regions of the U.S. [45–52], summarized in Table 3. For 
most studies, we report the effect of VRE as the decrease in the average RT wholesale price with 
the average amount of VRE over the study period, relative to the average price without the VRE; 
in two cases, however, the estimates represent the reduction in wholesale prices over time due to 
total growth in VRE. Where available, we also report the VRE penetration as the average VRE 
over the period relative to the average demand over the period. The empirically estimated 
reduction in average wholesale electricity prices from wind and solar range from $0-8.9/MWh, 
depending on the region, the time period of the analysis, the VRE technology and its level of 
penetration, and the study. A study focused on ERCOT finds higher merit order effects in the 
wind-rich West Texas region, where transmission constraints led to reduced and negative prices 
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before Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) transmission assets were completed in 
2013 [53]. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Average Wholesale Price Reduction Associated with VRE Growth  
Study 
Applicable 
Region 
Time 
Period 
Average VRE 
Penetration (% of 
demand) 
Decrease in Average Wholesale 
Price from Average VRE 
Woo et al. 2011 ERCOT 2007-2010 Wind: 5.1% 
Wind: 
$2.7/MWh (ERCOT North) 
$6.8/MWh (ERCOT West) 
Woo et al. 2013 
Pacific NW  
(Mid-C) 
2006-2012 N/A  Wind: $3.9/MWh 
Woo et al. 2014 
CAISO 
(SP15) 
2010-2012 
Wind: 3.4% 
Solar: 0.6% 
Wind: $8.9/MWh  
Solar: $1.2/MWh  
Woo et al. 2016 
CAISO  
(SP15) 
2012-2015 
Wind: 4.3% 
Solar: 2.6% 
Wind: $7.7/MWh  
Solar: $2.1/MWh 
Gil and Jin 2013 PJM 2010 Wind: 1.3% Wind: $5.3/MWh 
Wiser et al. 2016a 
Various 
regions  
2013 
RPS energy: 0%-16% 
depending on the region 
RPS energy: $0 to $4.6/MWh 
depending on the region 
Jenkins 2017b PJM  2008-2016 N/A Wind: $1-2.5/MWh 
Haratyk 2017 b 
Midwest 
Mid-
Atlantic 
2008-2015 
2008-2015 
N/A 
Wind: $4.6/MWh 
Wind: $0/MWh 
Notes: a – Price effect is estimated impact of RPS energy relative to price without RPS energy in 2013 before making 
adjustments due to the decay effect discussed by the authors. b – Decrease in average wholesale price is based on change in wind 
energy from 2008-2016 (Jenkins 2017) or 2008-2015 (Haratyk 2017), rather than the decrease from average wind reported in 
other rows. 
 
Additional studies[4,7,54], sometimes using more stylized and/or partial assessments, are not 
included in the table above.  
 
This sample of U.S. focused studies is a subset of a much broader literature of similar analyses of 
the price effect of wind and solar in Europe, with many of the studies summarized by [15,55,56]. 
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The range of the merit order effect in Table 3 is within the range of results for wind and solar in 
European countries as summarized in [15].  
 
Growth in VRE, of course, is not the only factor affecting average wholesale prices. We use a 
simple fundamental merit order model to quantify the contribution of different factors to the 
observed decline in wholesale prices between 2008 and 2016 for the CAISO, a region with 
recent growth in both utility-scale and distributed solar, and ERCOT, a region with significant 
growth in wind (Figure 14). We select these two regions for two primary reasons: (1) they 
represent regions with among the highest shares of VRE, and (2) as single-state ISOs, they are 
relatively easier to model than multi-state markets.  
 
The simple fundamental model uses a merit-order supply curve based on individual generator 
capacity and marginal costs along with hourly observed demand and VRE production to estimate 
hourly prices. Following generally similar approaches used to explain the decrease in wholesale 
prices in Germany [56–58]6 as well as in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic [52], we isolate the 
impact of each individual factor on the decline in wholesale prices by holding all factors from 
2016 fixed except for one that is changed from its 2016 value to its 2008 value. For example, we 
estimate the impact of growing amounts of renewable energy by changing the renewable 
electricity supply from its 2016 value to its 2008 value, while keeping other factors constant at 
their 2016 levels. Green bars represent the estimated magnitude of each factor that contributed to 
a decline in wholesale prices between 2008 and 2016, whereas red bars represent factors that 
mitigated the price decline over the same period.  
 
Even with the many simplifications used to model wholesale power prices in this way, the supply 
curve model is able to reasonably match the 2008 and 2016 observed average wholesale prices in 
CAISO and ERCOT (see the comparison between the black markers and the blue bars in the 
figure). The model does not, however, replicate the hour-to-hour variability in prices since it 
ignores transmission constraints, operating limits on thermal generators, negative price bids from 
                                                        6 Somewhat more-stylized and partials attempts to conduct similar analysis in various regions of the United States can be found in: [4,7,54].  
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VRE, etc.; related, by only exploring market-wide averages, the model is not able to assess 
geographic variations in pricing as might be caused by transmission congestion.  
 
With those caveats in mind, we do see clear evidence that the primary driver of the decline in 
average wholesale electricity prices between 2008 and 2016 in ERCOT and CAISO is the 
decline in natural gas prices. We find that growth in VRE generation contributed less than 5% to 
the overall price decline, whereas natural gas price reductions contributed 85-90% of the overall 
decline in wholesale electricity prices in these markets. Other factors considered in the model 
include: other types of generation additions (typically natural gas); changes in emissions 
allowance prices; changes in coal, oil, uranium, and other fuel prices; generation unit 
retirements; changes in electricity load; and variations in hydropower output. The ‘interaction’ 
term, meanwhile, represents the difference between the 2008 and 2016 modeled wholesale prices 
that this method was not able to attribute to individual factors due to interactions between 
multiple factors. For example, we show the impact of VRE and natural gas when changed 
individually, but they likely have a different impact when changed simultaneously. In summary, 
these various additional factors also individually contribute to accelerating or mitigating the 
overall price decline in ERCOT and CAISO, but, as with VRE, all are minor contributors 
compared to natural gas price shifts.  
 
These findings are consistent with recent analysis focused on wholesale prices affecting nuclear 
plants in Illinois. In particular, using statistical techniques, Jenkins [51] estimates the drivers for 
wholesale price reductions from 2008 through 2016, finding that the decline in natural gas prices 
was the dominant factor, resulting in wholesale price reductions of roughly $20/MWh (42-43% 
reduction). Growth of wind in MISO and PJM was found to have a much smaller effect of ~$1-
2.5/MWh (2-5% reduction). Haratyk [52], meanwhile, estimates the drivers for wholesale price 
reductions from 2008 to 2015 in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions, finding that natural gas 
price declines and load reductions were the two dominant drivers with growth in wind playing a 
relatively smaller role.  
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ERCOT 
  
CAISO 
  
Note: 2016 used as the base year. 
Source: LBNL analysis using simple supply curve model and data from ABB Velocity Suite [44], EIA, and assumptions. 
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Figure 14. Estimated Contribution of Various Drivers to the Observed Decline in Average 
Wholesale Electricity Prices in ERCOT and CAISO 
 
4.2. Prevalence and Impact of Negative Pricing at Selected Pricing Hubs 
 
In addition to affecting average wholesale prices, VRE can impact wholesale price variability, 
which may be particularly evident by tracking the frequency of negative prices. Negative prices 
typically arise from surplus supply along with technical or economic constraints that prevent 
reductions in generation output. Transmission limitations tend to be an accelerant of negative 
pricing, driving prices lower in congested markets as the surplus supply is unable to find other 
markets to which to sell. As negative pricing is a symptom of excess supply, it is not surprising 
that the prevalence of negative pricing is greater during periods with lower system-wide load. 
The PTC and RPS programs that prioritize generation from renewable resources provide an 
incentive for renewable generators to continue to produce energy even when the energy price is 
negative. Rigid contracts that do not allow for economic curtailment yield similar results. Even 
market demand for ‘green energy’ yields positive prices for RECs, creating incentives for 
negative-price bids by VRE. Of course, VREs are not the only resources that bid negative prices 
in wholesale electricity markets. The lack of flexibility from existing nuclear power plants in the 
United States, for example, means that these plants will often bid negative prices to avoid costly 
shutdowns and start-ups. Fossil units (whether coal or natural gas) may also—at times—bid 
negative prices due to the costs of flexible operations. Even hydropower plants sometimes 
generate during negative-priced hours, in some cases due to run-of-river operations and in others 
as a result of environmental constraints. Other units may have contractual requirements that 
create the same incentives for negative bidding, or may be required to operate for reliability 
purposes regardless of market pricing. The fact that many types of power plants—at times—
continue to generate power when prices at major hubs are negative is demonstrated below. 
 
Overall, the frequency of negative prices at a select number of large electricity pricing hubs 
(Figure 15) indicates that negative prices in most of these hubs continue to be rare, and almost 
non-existent in day-ahead prices, though there is some indication of increased frequency of 
negative real-time prices with increasing shares of VRE resources. The SP15 hub in CAISO 
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shows a markedly higher frequency of negative real-time prices than other hubs (6.6% in 2016, 
compared to 2% or less in all other selected hubs shown in the figure), and the frequency is 
expected to rise significantly in 2017 due to growth in VRE and high hydropower production 
[59]. Several initiatives in the West including expansion of the CAISO Energy Imbalance 
Market, potential regional expansion of CAISO to include PacifiCorp and other interested 
utilities, and improved coordination and utilization of transmission capacity with the Pacific 
Northwest may all help mitigate this increase in negative price frequency over time [59]. Even in 
CAISO, however, it is clear that VRE is not the only contributing factor to negative prices. The 
highest share of negative price hours occurred in 2011 (nearly 8% of hours in real-time market 
and over 1% of hours in day-ahead market), before the recent large-scale growth in solar.  
 
Outside of CAISO, the figure suggests that recent growth in VRE may be contributing to 
negative real-time pricing at the selected major trading hubs in ERCOT, SPP, and perhaps in 
ISO-NE: in all three regions, the prevalence of negative pricing has increased recently, along 
with the growth in VRE, demonstrating correlation if not causation.7 The same cannot be said for 
the selected major hubs in MISO, PJM, and NYISO, however. If anything, the prevalence of 
negative pricing in these specific hubs has declined in recent years, though other research 
suggests that pricing at still other hubs in these areas has been impacted by the growth in VRE 
[60]. Regardless, at all of these specific hubs, negative pricing remains rare. In the real time 
market, negative pricing occurred 2% of hours or less in 2016; in the day ahead market—which 
is most relevant for inflexible baseload generation—negative pricing outside of California has 
been almost non-existent at these specific hubs.  
 
                                                        7 Further analysis of the time- and geographic- profile of negative pricing events can help identify some of the causes. For example, [4] find that the profile of negative pricing in ERCOT is correlated with wind production and [43] shows that negative prices occurred during daytime hours in 2016, times of high solar, whereas most were during night-time hours in 2012. [60] review numerous hubs in many of the U.S. ISOs/RTOs, tracking negative pricing trends over time and diurnally, finding that the trends in negative price hours is suggestive of a VRE impact.  
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Note: Real-time values are shown behind day-ahead values.  The bars are not stacked on top of each other.  
Sources: Negative price share comes from LBNL analysis of ABB Velocity Suite data. VRE regional penetration estimates come, 
in part, from annual wind generation reported in ABB’s Velocity Suite divided by total generation in the region. Since ABB does 
not include generation <1 MW and since large-scale solar generation data were incomplete for the year 2016, we estimate solar 
generation based on state-level capacity, and regional capacity factors from NREL. Distributed solar generation is also added to 
total generation when calculating VRE penetrations.8  
Figure 15. Frequency of Negative Wholesale Electricity Prices in the Real-Time and Day-Ahead 
Markets at Several Major Trading Hubs 
 
We estimate the real-time wholesale price had there been no negative prices by comparing the 
actual average wholesale price to the average after replacing negative prices with $0/MWh. In 
effect, this removes any potential impact of policies like the PTC or RPS that would incentivize a 
VRE generator to submit a negative bid, though it also removes any impact of inflexible 
generation that sets the price with a negative bid. Given the rarity of negative pricing at most of 
these major trading hubs so far, it comes as little surprise that they have had almost no impact on 
average day-ahead prices and little impact on average real-time wholesale electricity prices at 
these specific hubs. 
 
                                                        8 Based on our calculation the VRE penetration in CAISO is 17.3% of in-region generation. Readers may be more familiar with penetration numbers based on served load. Accounting for distributed solar in both generation and load estimates, the CAISO VRE penetration is 16.1% of served load.  
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The only noticeable effect is CAISO, where real-time wholesale prices in 2015 were $1.7/MWh 
(6%) lower due to negative prices than they would have been without negative prices. This gap 
equals $0.9/MWh (3%) in 2016, and is expected to grow in the near term due to increases in 
VRE and high river flows driving increased production from hydropower facilities. At all other 
large trading hubs explored here, negative prices have had no noticeable effect on the annual 
average day-ahead or real-time wholesale prices for every year examined.  
 
 
4.3. Contributors to Negative Pricing at Major Hubs 
 
To understand which resources are potentially contributing to negative real-time prices at the 
selected major pricing hubs, we utilize hourly aggregate generation data provided by five ISOs 
(CAISO, ERCOT, SPP, MISO, and NYISO9). Specifically, we compare average generation—by 
generation type—during positive price hours to average generation during negative price hours 
in 2016 (Figure 16).10 Note that some of the regions have a very low number of negative price 
hours, making generalizations difficult. Since the frequency of negative prices in CAISO was 
highest in 2011 we include an analysis of 2011 for CAISO in addition to 2016.   
Except in MISO, negative prices in 2016 occurred at times when aggregate generation (and 
system load) was, on average, lower than load during positive price times. VRE also tended to 
generate more during negative price hours at major hubs than during positive price hours, though 
the contribution of VRE varies by technology and region. In 2016, solar in CAISO is clearly 
generating more during negative price hours at the SP15 hub, on average, than during positive 
price hours. But, in 2011, solar in CAISO was generating less on average during negative price 
hours at the SP15 hub. Solar was not generating at all during negative prices in 2016 in ERCOT 
or SPP. Wind is always generating more—on average—during negative price hours. In contrast, 
                                                        9 PJM only reports hourly wind generation, but not aggregate generation from other resources. ISO-NE does not report hourly aggregate generation of any resource. As such, neither PJM nor ISO-NE are included in this analysis.  10 In contrast to our approach, Goggin [61] explores the frequency of negative pricing hours that are specifically of the magnitude one might expect from the PTC and RPS. This method is appropriate if one is only interested in the ‘bidding effect’ of the PTC and RPS in inducing negative-priced bids. However, as described earlier, VRE can also influence the prevalence of negative prices in wholesale markets though the ‘deployment effect’ by virtue of affecting the supply stack with large volumes of zero-marginal-cost generation. Our approach implicitly accounts for both effects.  
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more flexible generation like hydro and gas tend to produce significantly less power on average 
during negative price hours than during positive price hours. Coal in ERCOT and SPP similarly 
produces less during negative price hours. Nuclear plants tend to operate at full power during 
periods of negative prices, and also during periods of positive prices.11  
 
Even though negative prices had the highest frequency in 2011 at the SP15 hub in CAISO, 
comparison of the absolute level of generation in 2011 and 2016 shows that VRE was much 
lower in 2011. In 2011, hydropower and nuclear were considerably higher than in 2016 in both 
positive and negative price hours; imports also decreased to a lesser degree in 2011 during the 
negative price hours. As shown earlier in Figure 15, the frequency of negative prices dropped in 
2012; this timing correlates with the 2 GW San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station being taken 
offline as well as a decline in hydropower output; the effect of hydropower on historical negative 
price events in California and the Northwest is also covered in [62]. This illustrates that the 
drivers for negative pricing are not limited to VREs but also arises during periods without much 
flexibility but with significant nuclear and hydropower generation. While VRE resources are 
generating more in negative price hours there are also many other generation resources 
generating at the same time.  
 
  
                                                        11 The lower average generation during positive price hours relative to negative price hours for nuclear plants in SPP and MISO was due to large nuclear outages that occurred during periods of positive prices. These outages led to lower nuclear production over the year, though the plants were closer to full output during negative price hours.  
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Source: LBNL analysis of ABB Velocity Suite data. 
Figure 16. Generation of Various Resources during Positive and Negative Price Periods in 2016 
(and, for CAISO, also 2011) 
 
4.4. Locational Impacts: The Influence of Transmission Limits on Specific Trading Hubs  
 
Major trading hubs do not reveal the full story of VRE impacts. Transmission limits between 
where generation is located and load centers can lead to congestion and a higher prevalence of 
negative pricing in constrained zones and nodes. According to a recent report by DOE, for 
example, PJM has indicated that impacts can be more severe on specific buses, and can impact 
the economics of specific generating units. In particular, PJM observed that “Since 2014, PJM 
has seen prices go negative at nuclear unit buses in approximately 2,176 hours—representing 14 
percent of off-peak hours” [1]. West Texas, meanwhile, is a wind-rich region in ERCOT. 
Transmission investments through the CREZ initiative started to be completed in 2011, 
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significantly reducing congestion in West Texas and the prevalence of negative price hours in 
that region. 
 
To more systematically demonstrate the geographic differences in wholesale prices between 
major trading hubs and selected pricing nodes, Figure 17 compares the frequency of negative 
day-ahead and real-time prices and average annual real-time prices between the ERCOT North 
Hub, the ERCOT West Hub, and the average of ten pricing nodes in the West zone with the 
largest amount of wind power in 2016. Negative prices in real-time and day-ahead markets were 
significantly more prevalent in the wind-rich regions in 2011 and 2012 at the start of the CREZ 
transmission expansion, before declining dramatically through 2014 as the CREZ lines were 
completed [38]. Average annual real-time prices at the ERCOT West hub and the ten selected 
wind-rich pricing nodes have consistently been lower than prices at ERCOT North. Negative 
prices, in particular, caused the average real-time price at wind nodes to be nearly $2/MWh (5%) 
lower than they would have been without negative prices in 2011, though by 2016 the impact of 
negative prices was less than $0.6/MWh (3%). Negative prices caused the average day-ahead 
price at wind nodes to be $0.5/MWh (1%) lower than without negative prices in 2011, dropping 
$0.2/MWh (1%) less in 2016 (note, day-ahead prices are not shown in the figure). Negative 
prices—while still rare—are again on the rise since 2014 as wind penetration continues to 
increase in ERCOT; moreover, negative real-time prices are now spreading outside of the wind-
rich West zone (see also, [4] and [60], which also evaluate ERCOT pricing).  
 
 
ERCOT NEGATIVE PRICES
 
PJM NEGATIVE PRICES 
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ERCOT AVERAGE RT WHOLESALE PRICES 
 
PJM AVERAGE RT WHOLESALE PRICES 
 
Note: Average real-time prices without negative prices are shown as the dark band stacked on top of the average wholesale prices 
with negative prices. 
Source: LBNL analysis of ABB Velocity Suite data. 
Figure 17. Comparison of Frequency of Negative Prices and Average Real-Time Prices between 
Major Trading Hubs and Constrained Nodes in ERCOT and PJM  
The same comparison is conducted for the PJM Western Hub (in Pennsylvania) and the N. 
Illinois Hub, the latter of which is near a large nuclear plant (Quad City) and several wind plants 
in the ComEd zone of PJM (Figure 18); we therefore compile data on pricing at the two hubs, 
but also at the Quad City pricing node and various wind project pricing nodes (Figure 17 and Figure 18). Though negative pricing is infrequent at the PJM Western Hub, it is far more 
common at the other locations. This is particularly true at the Quad City node, where negative 
prices have occurred for more than 6% of the hours in seven out of the last eight years, and have 
reduced annual average real-time prices by roughly $2.3/MWh (10%) over the last eight years. 
Negative day-ahead prices have reduced the annual average day-ahead prices by less than 
$0.2/MWh (1%) over the same timeframe. The increase in the frequency of negative prices at the 
Quad City node tends to track the cumulative installed capacity of wind in the ComEd zone of 
PJM. On average, wholesale prices at the N. Illinois Hub, and at the Quad City and wind nodes 
analyzed here, are substantially lower than the PJM Western Hub. Persistent differences in LMPs 
across nodes may signal the need for additional investment in transmission to resource-rich 
areas. Additional factors to explore in future analysis include whether similar increases in 
negative prices are observed at other nuclear and other fuel plants in the ComEd region, 
additional factors other than growth in wind that may be correlated with the increase in 
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frequency of negative pricing, and the extent to which the frequency of negative prices would be 
reduced without the PTC.  
 
Related to these additional analysis possibilities, the PJM market monitor reports that 3-5% of 
the marginal units in the real-time market in PJM were wind between 2012 and 2016 while less 
than 0.1% of the marginal units were nuclear between 2012 and 2015 and 1% were nuclear in 
2016 [63]. MISO, meanwhile, has areas where local prices are frequently set by wind, even 
though wind set the system-wide marginal price less than 1% of the time in 2016 [39]. Bajawa 
and Cavicchi [60], meanwhile, explore the frequency and temporal profile of negative pricing in 
a wide variety of hubs across the United States.  
 
  
  
Source: Power plant capacity and plant zip code from ABB Velocity Suite data, with locations estimated from zip codes.  
Figure 18. Location of Quad Cities Nuclear Plant, Large Wind Pricing Nodes, N. Illinois Hub, 
and Western Hub in PJM 
 
4.5. Impacts on Recent Thermal-Plant Asset Retirements 
 
There has been a significant amount of retirements of thermal generation assets in recent years, 
with [1,64,65] and others finding that retiring coal and natural-gas plants tend to be older, 
smaller, less efficient, more-emitting, and operating at lower capacity factors than the remaining 
fleet. For example, as shown in [64], coal plants that retired between 2010-2016 had an average 
age of 52 years while coal plants that did not retire or are scheduled for retirement had an 
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average age of 37 years in 2016. Retired coal plants had an average capacity of 122 MW, 
whereas plants not scheduled for retirement are larger at 239 MW on average. The heat rate of 
retired coal plants was slightly higher (10,386 Btu/kWh) than plants not scheduled for retirement 
(10,046 Btu/kWh), indicating that the plants that retired were also somewhat less efficient. The 
heat rate of retired gas plants (CCGT and CTs), meanwhile, was considerably larger than plants 
not scheduled for retirement. Finally, the most dramatic difference in the characteristics of 
retired coal plants compared to coal plants not scheduled to retire is the average SO2 emissions 
rate: the average emissions rate of coal plants that retired between 2010-2016 was 1.2 lbs 
SO2/MMBtu, while the emissions rate of the plants not scheduled for retirement was 0.2 lbs 
SO2/MMBtu.  
 
Plant retirements have been driven by a variety of market, policy, and plant-specific factors, with 
reductions in natural gas prices often identified as the most impactful single cause [1,52,54,65–
68]. There is uncertainty, however, on the relative contributions of various factors, and on the 
specific role of VRE growth [1,7,68–74].  
 
We explore whether VRE growth is correlated with regional retirement percentages (2010-2016 
retirements, relative to total non-VRE capacity in 2016) in Figure 19.  Visual inspection does 
not offer perfect clarity, thought there does not appear to be any obvious widespread relationship 
between VRE penetration and recent historical regional retirement decisions. PJM and SERC, 
both with very low VRE penetrations, have among the largest amount of recent total thermal-
plant and coal & nuclear plant retirement. ERCOT, SPP, and the non-ISO portion of the Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region, on the other hand, all have sizable VRE 
penetrations but low retirement percentages. CAISO has experienced strong growth in VRE and 
has the highest level of total thermal-plant retirements on a percentage basis, most of which are 
older natural-gas steam plants; many of those plants have retired as a compliance mechanism 
with California’s policy to phase out once-through cooling [75].  
 
In contrast, we see stronger relationships between regional retirement differences and factors 
including SO2 emissions rates (for coal), planning reserve margins (for all thermal units), 
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variations in load growth or contraction (for all thermal units), and the age of older thermal plans 
(for all thermal units).12 
 
 
 
Source: Historical retirement data from ABB’s Velocity Suite dataset [44], accessed in May 2017. VRE regional penetration 
estimates come, in part, from annual wind generation reported in ABB’s Velocity Suite divided by total generation in the region. 
Since ABB does not include generation <1 MW and since large-scale solar generation data were incomplete for the year 2016, 
we estimate solar generation based on state-level capacity, and regional capacity factors from NREL. Distributed solar generation 
is also added to total generation when calculating VRE penetrations.  
Figure 19. Correlation Chart of VRE Penetration and Regional Retirement Trends  
Visual inspection of correlation charts is not dispositive in establishing causal relationships, but 
it does support the statement that VRE growth has, so far, had relatively little obvious 
widespread impact on retirements.  This is consistent with the findings presented earlier on the 
relatively modest impact of VRE on average wholesale power prices, at least at the selected 
major trading hubs. 
 
                                                        12 Additional correlation charts are presented in [64]  
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Notwithstanding the limited evidence of a widespread impact of VRE on historical retirement 
decisions, that is not to say that VRE has had no such impact, or will not in the future. Growth in 
VRE does place some downward pressure on wholesale prices and tends to reduce the capacity 
factors of thermal plants; these effects tend to be larger in transmission-constrained zones and 
when there are lower levels of overall flexibility. Inflexible generation sources may be at special 
risk given these dynamics. In part as a result, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) specifically notes 
growing levels of VRE as one of the many reasons to retire the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant in 
California [76]. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The surveyed studies are generally in agreement that increasing VRE penetrations will decrease 
average wholesale energy prices (i.e., LMPs) in the short run (in non-restructured electricity 
markets, meanwhile, VRE would be expected to reduce average short-run marginal operating 
costs).  The long-run wholesale energy price impacts are less clear as many of the surveyed 
studies do not reflect long-run equilibrium conditions. In the long run (and at fixed VRE levels), 
price impacts may be less pronounced due to changes in the generation mix as that mix adapts to 
higher levels of VRE. 
 
Our analysis of electricity market data through 2016 indicates that VRE so far has had a 
relatively modest impact on historical average annual wholesale prices across entire market 
regions, at least in comparison to other drivers; this is true even in those ISOs with the largest 
VRE penetrations. The reduction of natural gas prices is the primary contributor to the decline in 
wholesale prices since 2008. And, because of the low price of natural gas, regional ‘supply 
curves’ are particularly flat; this is a core reason why VRE has had a relatively modest impact on 
annual prices so far. Some of the surveyed studies similarly demonstrated that changes in natural 
gas prices have a significant impact on wholesale electricity prices. In many cases, natural gas 
price sensitivity scenarios produced price impacts that were comparable to impacts produced by 
the VRE scenarios.  
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Very few of the surveyed studies present results on price variability.  Those that did indicated 
that electricity price variability may increase with increasing VRE penetrations, particularly with 
high solar generation.  Our analysis of historical market data provides some evidence that that 
the temporal and geographic patterns in wholesale prices have changed in areas with higher 
levels of VRE. Specifically, negative prices have sometimes increased with VRE, though the 
prevalence of negative pricing so far remains limited at most of the selected large pricing hubs 
that are the focus of our analysis, and the net impact of negative prices on overall average 
wholesale prices at these same hubs has also been minor. CAISO pricing is, to a degree, the 
exception. Moreover, negative pricing is a larger issue in specific, often transmission-constrained 
zones, and especially during periods of relatively low system-wide load. We find that VRE is 
generally correlated with negative price hours; inflexibly operated nuclear plants are also major 
contributors. Wide variation in prices and periods of negative prices may increase the 
attractiveness of increasing in energy storage which, in turn, would mitigate the price effects.  
Recent decreases in the cost of storage suggest the role of storage should be considered in more 
detail than it has been in the studies reviewed here.    
 
Though wholesale energy prices (LMPs) are anticipated to decline with increasing VRE, the 
surveyed studies show a general trend of increasing prices for regulation reserves with increasing 
VRE penetrations. Prices for spinning and non-spinning reserves (reserve levels for which are 
often set by the single largest contingency, and not VRE) appear to be more stable, however the 
picture is less clear for these reserve products given limited coverage in the literature. 
 
The reviewed forward-looking studies generally did not model retirement decisions of specific 
plants, in fact, most assumed fixed generation portfolios and did not consider unit retirements 
driven by economics at all. However, several studies did attempt to project changes in revenues 
and profits that would be experienced in a high VRE future. These studies generally found 
nuclear and coal operating profits and revenues were to decrease with increasing VRE 
penetrations, however the magnitude of this effect differed between studies. The operating 
profits (i.e. revenue minus operating costs) of natural gas fired generators are less exposed to 
increasing VRE levels given their flexibility characteristics and resultant ability to dispatch down 
and reduce operating costs when wholesale prices are low. Studies differed in how they account 
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for different potential revenue streams, e.g. few studies comprehensively included possible 
revenues from capacity and ancillary service markets, making comparisons difficult. The 
surveyed results unfortunately do not provide insight into whether or not, or the extent to which, 
these revenues changes may motivate unit retirements in the future.   Our analysis of historical 
data shows that although some specific power plants may have retired in part due to the impacts 
of VRE, we find little relationship between the location of recent thermal-plant retirements and 
VRE. Moreover, given the relatively modest impact of VRE on average annual wholesale 
electricity prices across large market regions, it is unlikely that VRE has influenced retirements 
on a widespread basis so far. 
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Table 4. Studies Reviewed to Assess Potential Impacts of VRE on the Bulk Power System 
Title Author Year Published Region 
Target 
Year Model Key Scenarios 
Thermal Capacity Fixed Across VRE Penetrations 
Western Wind and Solar Integration 
Study: Phase 1 [24] GE Energy 2010 WestConnect 2017 MAPS 
· 3% wind, 0% solar 
· 10% wind, 1% solar 
· 20% wind, 3% solar 
· 30% wind, 5% solar 
Growing Wind: Final Report of the 
NYISO 2010 Wind Generation Study 
[25] 
NYISO 2010 NYISO 2018 GridView · 1,275 MW wind (current) · 8,000 MW wind total (10%+) 
Western Wind and Solar Integration 
Study: Phase 2 [20] Lew et al. 2013 
Western 
Interconnection 2020 ReEDS/PLEXOS 
· No renewables 
· 9.4% wind, 3.6% solar 
· 25% wind, 8% solar 
· 4. 8% wind, 25% solar 
· 16.5% wind, 16.5% solar 
Fundamental Drivers of the Cost and 
Price of Operating Reserves [23] Hummon et al.  2013 Colorado 2020 PLEXOS · 15% - 35% VRE 
PJM Renewable Integration Study [26] 
 
 
GE Energy  2014 PJM 2026 GE MAPS 
· 2% VRE 
· 14% VRE 
· 20% VRE (several cases) 
· 30% VRE (several cases) 
Market Effects of Wind Integration in 
ERCOT [27] LCG Consulting 2016 ERCOT 2021 UPLAN 
· 15.8 GW wind 
· 22.9 GW wind 
· 30 GW wind 
The Impact of Wind Power on 
Electricity Prices [77] 
Brancucci 
Martinez-Anido 
et al. 
2016 ISO-NE Not specified PLEXOS 
· 0% wind 
· 5.0% wind 
· 8.6% wind 
· 15.6% wind 
· 21.2% wind 
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Impact of Market Behavior, Fleet 
Composition, and Ancillary Services on 
Revenue Sufficiency [28] 
Frew et al. 2016 ERCOT 2012 to 2014 PLEXOS 
· 10% wind 
· 20% wind 
· 20% wind w/ flexibility req. 
Solar PV Integration Cost Variation 
Due to Array Orientation and 
Geographic Location in the Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas [33] 
Deetjen et al. 2016 ERCOT 2012 PLEXOS · 9.3% wind · 9.3% wind + 6.8% solar  
Low Carbon Grid Study: Analysis of a 
50% Emission Reduction in California 
[78] 
Brinkman et al. 2016 California 2030 PLEXOS · 20% solar + 7% wind · 24% solar + 18% wind 
Thermal Capacity Varied With VRE Penetration 
Eastern Wind Integration and 
Transmission Study [21] 
EnerNex 
Corporation 2011 
Eastern 
Interconnection 
(EI) 
2024 PROMOD 
· 6% wind 
· 20% wind (3 cases) 
· 30% wind 
Renewable Energy Futures Study [19] Hand et al. 2012 United States 2050 ReEDS and GridView 
·6.9% VRE (baseline) 
·13.7% - 64.1% VRE 
The Potential Rate Effects of Wind 
Energy and Transmission in the 
Midwest ISO Region [79] 
Fagan et al. 2012 MISO 
2020 
and 
2030 
ProSym 
· 10 GW wind 
· 30-50 GW wind (2020) 
· 60-110 GW wind (2030) 
Changes in the Economic Value of 
Variable Generation at High 
Penetration Levels: A Pilot Case Study 
of California [31] 
Mills and Wiser 2012 CAISO 2030 Original model · 0% - 40% wind · 0% - 40% solar 
Exploring Natural Gas and Renewables 
in ERCOT Part II: Future Generation 
Scenarios for Texas [34] 
Shavel et al. 2013 ERCOT 2032 Xpand/PSO 
· Reference 
· High Gas, Low Renewable Costs 
(HGLR) 
· HGLR + Stringent Carbon Rule 
Electricity market design for generator 
revenue sufficiency with increased 
variable generation [29] 
Levin and 
Botterud 2015 ERCOT 2024 Original model · 10% - 40% wind 
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Eastern Renewable Generation 
Integration Study [22] Bloom at al.  2016 
Eastern 
Interconnection 
(EI) 
2026 ReEDS/PLEXOS 
· 3% wind, 0% solar 
· 12% wind, .25% solar 
· 20% wind, 10% solar 
· 25% wind, 5% solar 
NESCOE Issues Renewable and Clean 
Energy Scenario Analysis and 
Mechanisms 2.0 Study [30] 
NESCOE 2017 ISO-NE 
2025 
and 
2030 
Original model 
· 26.28%/28.71% RPS (2025/2030) 
· 35%/40% RPS (2025/2030) 
· 40%/45% RPS (2025/2030) 
Economic and technical challenges of 
flexible operations under large-scale 
variable renewable deployment [32] 
Bistline 2017 CAISO and ERCOT 2030 US-REGEN 
· 0-100 GW wind (ERCOT) 
· 0-100 GW solar (CAISO) 
 
